Being realistic: the challenge of theory change for a metaphysics of scientific realism

Kerry McKenzie

Abstract


Chakravartty (2007) and others have pressed that the defender of scientific realism needs to supply a metaphysical story, most saliently a modal story, of how knowledge of the unobservable can be possible. Here I consider the challenge the problem of theory change poses to theories of modal metaphysics.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26998